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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
: CaseNo.20080287-SC 
JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G. HAVAS; 
and P and F FOOD SERVICES, : 
Defendants/Appellants. : 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)0') (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The district court held that the defendants did not own a right to view.1 This 
appurtenant easement had been sold to Utah's Department of Transportation (UDOT) by 
prior owners of the property in question. R. 340, 342, 396. Because defendants failed to 
1
 The right to view (an appurtenant easement) protects the right to the view out 
from a property to the adjacent public road. The alleged right to visibility claims a 
protected right of a property to be viewed by those on an adjacent public road. 
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raise the issue in their opening brief, they have waived their right to challenge this 
holding of the district court. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is 
unique to this Court and does not entail review of the district court's decision. 
2. The district court's determination, on remand, that the defendants did not own 
an appurtenant easement of view is not contrary to the law of the case. This Court's prior 
decision did not consider whether the defendants owned an easement of view. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised by defendants in their 
response to UDOT's motion in limine. R. 358-59. The district court considered this issue 
and rejected it. R. 392. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Whether the trial court properly complied, on 
remand, with our decision . . . is a question of law which we review for correctness." 
Slatterv v. Covev & Co.. 909 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah 1995). 
3. UDOT has the statutory right to reduce the amount of property included in its 
taking. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-512(2) (West Supp. 2008). The district court correctly 
permitted UDOT to amend its taking so as to not seek condemnation of an easement of 
view where the defendants did not own such a right. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised below by UDOT. R.403. 
The district court considered this issue and granted UDOT's motion in limine, in part, for 
this reason. R. 469-70. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: Where a motion in limine is granted based on the 
district court's legal conclusions, the decision is reviewed for correctness. UDOTv. 
Ivers, 2005 UT App 519, f9,128 P.3d 74, aff d in part and remanded. Ivers v. UDOT. 
2007 UT 19, 154P.3d802. 
4. In their opening brief, defendants ask this Court to alter the date set by statute 
for measuring their entitlement to compensation for their condemned property. This issue 
was not raised below, and they cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. Because this issue was not raised below, the 
district court did not consider it. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is unique to this Court and does not 
entail review of the district court's decision. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Addendum A to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 20, 2002, UDOT initiated this action to condemn a .048-acre strip 
along the side and front of the defendants' property. R 1-12. In their answer, the 
defendants alleged that they were entitled to severance damages for the impact of the 
condemnation on the remaining property. R. 25. On March 14, 2003, UDOT filed a 
motion in limine asking the district court to preclude the defendants from introducing 
evidence at trial of severance damages, including damages for alleged loss of the right to 
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view and visibility. R. 42-67. On May 30, 2003, the district court granted UDOT's 
motion as to view and visibility. R. 150-61. 
Defendants' first effort to appeal the district court's ruling was dismissed without 
prejudice on May 14, 2004 by the Utah Court of Appeals. The appeal was dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction because the challenged ruling was not eligible for certification as a 
final order pursuant to Utah R Civ. P. Rule 54(b). R. 224-227. 
The parties then stipulated as to all other issues in the action and a final judgment 
was entered on March 1,2005. R. 240-48. The stipulation and judgment expressly 
preserved the defendants' right to appeal the district court's ruling on UDOT's motion in 
limine. R. 242, 246. The challenged ruling was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
UDOT v. Ivers, 2005 UT App 519,103 P.3d 699. This Court granted the defendants' 
petition for certiorari as to the following issue: 
Whether article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution permits claims 
for compensation, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 permits presentation of 
evidence of damages, arising from an alleged easement for view or 
visibility, where the damages to the alleged easement are caused by 
construction beyond the boundaries of the landowner's property. 
R.271. 
On February 6, 2007, this Court ruled that there was no protectable property 
interest in visibility, but that an easement for view could be damaged by construction 
beyond the boundaries of the landowners' property if the use of the condemned portion of 
the property was essential to the completion of the project as a whole. Ivers v. UDOT, 
2007 UT 19, U125-26, 154 P.3d 802. Remittitur was issued on March 2, 2007. R. 290. 
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On May 2, 2007, UDOT filed a second motion in limine. R. 314-47. The motion 
was based on the fact that UDOT had already purchased the appurtenant easements, 
including that of view, from previous owners of the defendants' property. R. 323-24. 
The district court treated UDOT's motion in limine as a motion to amend its 
complaint. R. 386-99. While finding that the defendants would not be prejudiced (R. 
395), the district court denied the motion as being untimely. R. 395-96. However, the 
district court ruled that the defendants' predecessors in interest had sold their appurtenant 
easement of view to UDOT. R. 396. 
UDOT moved the district court to alter or amend its order. R. 400-24. The court 
granted this motion, reversing its prior decision denying UDOT's motion in limine. R. 
463-72. The court expressly ruled that the defendants did not own an appurtenant 
easement of view. R. 470. A final order to this effect was entered on March 20, 2008. R. 
473.476. The defendants filed their notice of appeal on April 2, 2008. R. 488-89. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The improvements to U.S. 89 that are the subject of this litigation are the most 
recent in a series of construction projects at the same site. 1.34 acres of the property now 
owned by the defendants was purchased by UDOT in 1964. The warranty deed expressly 
included the landowners5 appurtenant easements as part of the sale: 
To enable the grantee to construct and maintain a public highway as 
an expressway,... the grantors hereby release and relinquish to the grantee 
any and all rights or easements appurtenant to the grantors remaining 
property bv reason of the location thereof with reference to said highway. 
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including, without limiting the foregoing, all rights of ingress to or egress 
from the grantors remaining property to or from said highway. 
R. 328 (emphasis added). 
The only exception was a limited right of access retained by the owners, but no 
easement of view. Part of this limited right of access was then purchased from the 
property owners in 1971. R. 336-38. In 1992, a further .247 acre of the property was 
purchased by UDOT. The warranty deed again included the landowners' appurtenant 
easements as part of the sale: 
To enable the Utah Department of Transportation to construct and 
maintain a public highway as an expressway,... the Owners of said entire 
tract of property hereby release and relinquish to said Utah Department of 
Transportation any and all rights or easements appurtenant to the remaining 
property of said Owners by reason of the location thereof with reference to 
said highway, including, without limiting the foregoing, all rights of ingress 
to or egress from the grantors remaining property contiguous to the lands 
conveyed, to or from said highway. 
R. 340, 342 (emphasis added). 
Reviewing these deeds, the district court held that they unambiguously conveyed 
all of the appurtenant rights or easements to UDOT: 
[I]t is clear from the language of the two deeds that Arby's predecessors in 
interest intended to convey those appurtenant rights. "[T]he main object in 
construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties, especially that 
of the grantor, from the language used." Hartman v. Potter, et al., 596 P.2d 
653, 656 (Utah 1979) (emphasis in original). If a deed's language is plain 
and unambiguous, "parol evidence is not admissible to vary its terms . . . " 
and "the intention of the parties to a conveyance is open to interpretation 
only when words used are ambiguous." IdL 
Just as this Court finds that the language used in the Condemnation 
Resolution meant that UDOT sought to condemn all of the rights 
appurtenant to the parcel, the language used in the 1961 and 1992 deeds, 
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which is almost identical to the language used in the Condemnation 
Resolution, meant that the grantor intended to convey "any and all rights or 
easements appurtenant to the remaining property of said Owners... [.]" 
The language used was not ambiguous, and the intentions of the parties is 
[sic] therefore not open to interpretation. Arby's predecessors in interest 
intended to convey the appurtenant rights of the remaining parcel. 
R. 396. 
In its ruling on UDOT's motion to alter or amend, the district court granted 
UDOT's motion in limine. The court explained that UDOT could introduce the deeds to 
show that the defendants did not own a right to view and defendants would be precluded 
from submitting any evidence that they owned such a right. R. 470. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants have never owned an appurtenant easement of view. When they 
purchased their property, that right had already been sold to UDOT. The district court 
expressly held that the defendants' predecessors in interest had unambiguously deeded 
their easement of view to UDOT. The defendants have not challenged this ruling on 
appeal. Instead, they ask this Court to procedurally require UDOT to purchase the 
easement, again, from the defendants (by means of severance damages). This the district 
court refused to do, and that decision should be affirmed. 
The district court correctly held that UDOT had the statutory right to change the 
amount of property it was taking at any time. Defendants have failed to articulate a 
contrary interpretation of the statute. 
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For the first time on appeal, defendants ask this Court to adjust the date of 
valuation of the property. Defendants cannot raise a new issue for the first time on 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS HAVE WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE TO THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION THAT THEY HAVE NO RIGHT 
TO VIEW BY NOT RAISING IT IN THEIR OPENING BRIEF 
The district court held that the defendants did not own a right to view. It found 
that the prior owners of the property in question had sold that right to UDOT. R. 396, 
470. The appurtenant right of view, as discussed in Utah State Road Commission v. 
Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), is companion to, and derivative of, the easement for 
physical access. "The rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the 
land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute property rights forming part of the 
owner's estate." Miva, 526 P.2d at 928.2 The district court expressly held that "Arby's 
predecessors in interest intended to convey the appurtenant rights of the remaining 
parcel." R. 396. 
Defendants did not challenge this holding in their opening brief. By failing to do 
so, they have waived their right to raise this issue now. Where defendants do not analyze 
an issue in their opening brief, this Court will not review that issue. State v. Brown. 853 
2
 "An owner of land abutting on a street is also in possession of an easement of 
view, which constitutes a property right which may not be taken without just 
compensation." Id. at 929. 
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P.2d 851, 854 n.l (Utah 1992). Nor can they now raise it in their reply brief. "[I]t is well 
settled that 'issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were not presented in the 
opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate court.5" 
Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah. 2001 UT 75,1fl0 n.l, 31 P.3d 543. 
Defendants have failed to challenge the district court's holding that they do not 
possess a right to view. Because the defendants do not have a right of view, the district 
court correctly precluded them from presenting evidence of damages caused by an alleged 
loss of view. This decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
II. THIS COURT'S PRIOR DECISION DID NOT DETERMINE 
WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS HAD A RIGHT OF VIEW 
On remand, the district court granted UDOT's motion in limine, which it treated as 
a motion to amend the complaint. The motion was based on the fact that the defendants 
could not seek damages for loss of view from their property because they did not possess 
such a right. The right had been sold to UDOT by prior owners of the property. 
Defendants ask this Court to reject the district court's holding that they did not own a 
right to view on the ground that it was contrary to the law of the case set out in this 
Court's prior decision. Brief of Appellants at 14-15. 
The district court correctly determined that it could permit an amendment of the 
pleadings (raising a new argument) so long as the new issue was not foreclosed by this 
Court's decision. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180,181 (Utah 1986) ("the 
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pleadings may be amended after remand within the sound discretion of the trial court so 
long as they do not cover issues specifically foreclosed by the appellate court."). 
As a general rule, where a judgment or decree is affirmed or reversed 
and remanded with directions to enter a particular judgment, the trial court 
may not permit amended or supplemental pleadings to be framed to try 
rights already settled. This rule is not only reasonable, but necessary, if 
litigation is ever to come to an end. After an appellate court has once ruled 
upon issues presented to it, such ruling becomes the law of the case, and the 
trial court is bound to follow it, even though it considers the ruling 
erroneous. 
But where the entire case is not settled by the appellate tribunal 
where certain issues are left open by its judgment or decree, the trial court 
ordinarily has discretion to permit amended or supplemental pleadings as to 
those matters which have been left open. 
Street v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Ct. 191 P.2d 153, 158 (Utah 1948) (citation omitted). 
The issue before this Court on defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari was 
whether a property owner could present evidence of damages "arising from an alleged 
easement for view or visibility, where the damages to the alleged easement are caused by 
construction beyond the boundaries of the landowner's property." R. 271. This Court 
held that no easement of visibility existed under Utah law. Ivers v. UDOT. 2007 UT 19, 
ffl[12-15, 154P.3d802. 
This Court also held that severance damages for a loss of view could be recovered 
"when the view-impairing structure is built on land other than the condemned land, but 
the condemned land is used as part of a single project and that use is essential to 
completion of the project." Id. at [^26. This Court did not address the question of whether 
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the defendants possessed a right to view. That issue was not raised before this Court and 
certiorari was not granted to consider it. 
In Madsen v. Washington Mutual Bank FSB. 2008 UT 69,3 this Court ruled that a 
Utah cause of action was preempted by federal regulations. Id, 2008 UT 69 at ff 21-23. 
This was so even though a prior decision of this Court in that action had held that the 
Utah cause of action existed and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id. at ffl[6-
7. Though the federal regulation that preempted the state cause of action had been cited 
to the court in the prior appeal, the issue of preemption was not considered and the law of 
the case did not preclude the defendant from raising it on remand. 
When reviewing a decision made on one ground, we have the discretion to 
affirm the judgment on an alternative ground if it is apparent in the record. 
But that cannot mean, as the Madsens' contend here, that our declining to 
rule on an alternative ground can be construed as a ruling on the merits of 
the alternative ground, particularly when the alternative ground has not 
been argued by either party to the appeal. In fact, we frequently decline to 
rule on an issue when it has not been fully briefed by the parties because 
full briefing allows this court to carefully consider fully developed and 
supported arguments. The decision not to reach an alternative ground is 
certainly not binding on the court below, particularly when the parties did 
not argue the issue and this court's decision does not include so much as a 
single reference to the issue now supposedly foreclosed. 
Ida t t26 . 
Whether the defendants were entitled to severance damages was an issue left for 
the district court to determine on remand. The district court ruled on an issue that had 
been left open by this Court's decision. This Court's opinion did not foreclose UDOT 
3
 A copy is attached as Addendum B. 
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from raising the fact that it had already purchased all appurtenant easements, including 
the right to view, from previous owners of defendants' property. Neither party briefed 
this issue on the prior appeal. The question was not presented to this Court. The district 
court did not err in deciding this separate issue. The district court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
III. UDOT, BY LAW, CAN REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF 
PROPERTY THAT IT SEEKS TO CONDEMN 
By its motion in limine, UDOT sought to prevent the defendants from seeking 
damages for their alleged loss of view. In essence, the motion sought to reduce the 
amount of property UDOT was seeking by not condemning the defendants' right to view. 
The motion was based on the fact that the defendants did not own any such appurtenant 
easement. The district court held that UDOT, by statute, was permitted to reduce the 
amount of property that it sought to acquire. The statute provides: 
(2) The court or the jury shall consider mitigation or reduction of damages 
in its assessment of compensation and damages if, after the date of the 
service of summons, the plaintiff: 
(a) mitigates the damages to the property; or 
(b) reduces the amount of property actually taken. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-512(2) (West Supp. 2008). 
Defendants claim that the district court misinterpreted this statute, but fail to 
suggest the correct interpretation. Brief of Appellants at 15-20. The primary goal of 
courts in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent as evidenced by 
the plain language of the statute. State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, f25, 4 P.3d 795 ("We need 
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look beyond the plain language only if we find some ambiguity."). Defendants have not 
claimed that the statute is ambiguous. 
The plain language of Subsection 2 permits the reduction of damages if UDOT 
reduces the amount of property that it actually takes. UDOT's motion eliminated the 
appurtenant easement of view from the amount of property that UDOT was condemning. 
With this change, the district court correctly held that severance damages for loss of view 
were no longer recoverable by the defendants. 
IV. DEFENDANTS CANNOT CLAIM FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL THAT THE DATE OF VALUATION OF THEIR 
PROPERTY SHOULD BE CHANGED 
"For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right to 
compensation and damages shall be considered to have accrued at the date of the service 
of summons, and its actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all 
property to be actually taken " Utah Ctfde Ann. § 78B-6-512(l) (West Supp. 2008). 
In their opening brief, defendants ask this Court to change the date for measuring their 
damages from the date the summons was served to "a current date." Brief of Appellants 
at 20-21. Defendants argue that this should be done because of the alleged delay caused 
- 1 3 -
by UDOT's "shifting theories."4 Brief of Appellants at 20. This issue was not raised in 
the district court. Only before this Court have the defendants made this claim. 
In Rspinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990), the plaintiffs 
raised a constitutional claim for the first time on appeal. In refusing to consider the claim, 
this Court explained that 
Appellants' first claim is that the realignment violated article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution by denying them the liberty to control their children's 
education. This claim was raised for the first time on appeal. With limited 
exceptions, the practice of this Court has been to decline consideration of 
issues raised for the first time on appeal. We therefore do not address this 
claim. 
Id. at 413 (citations omitted). The limited exceptions to this general rule deal with cases 
in which the appellant demonstrates that "the trial court committed plain error or 
exceptional circumstances exist in this case." State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 
(Utah App. 1992) (footnote omitted). 
Defendants could have raised this issue below. Having failed to do so, they cannot 
do so now, particularly where they have not briefed the question of whether plain error or 
other exceptional circumstances exist that would warrant its consideration for the first 
time on appeal. Where the defendants did not analyze an issue in their opening brief, this 
Court will not review that issue. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854 n.l (Utah 1992). 
4
 Defendants' claim for damages due to loss of their right to view was denied by 
the district court on May 30, 2003, just over five months after the filing of this action. 
The issue was not revived until this Court's opinion of February 6, 2007. UDOT's 
motion in limine at issue in this appeal was filed less than three months after this Court's 
Opinion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons presented above, plaintiff urges this Court to affirm the decision of 
the district court. 
DATED this ^-~y day of September, 2008. 
7^J' A 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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- 1 5 -
ADDENDUM "A 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES & RULES 
78B-6-512. Damages — When right has accrued — Mitigation or reduction — 
Improvements. 
(1) For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right to compensation 
and damages shall be considered to have accrued at the date of the service of summons, 
and its actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property to 
be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously 
affected, in all cases where damages are allowed, as provided in Section 78B-6-511. 
(2) The court or the jury shall consider mitigation or reduction of damages in its 
assessment of compensation and damages if, after the date of the service of summons, the 
plaintiff: 
(a) mitigates the damages to the property; or 
(b) reduces the amount of property actually taken. 
(3) Improvements put upon the property by the property owner subsequent to the date 
of service of summons may not be included in the assessment of compensation or 
damages. 
ADDENDUM "B 
Wssttevu 
- - - P. 3d Page 1 
- - - P .3d , 2008 WL 4299622 ( U t a h ) , 2008 UT 69 
HMadsen v. Washington Mut. Bank fsb 
Utah,2008. 
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, 
IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL.NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT 
BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, 
IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Richard MADSEN and Nancy Madsen, for themselves 
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, Appellants, 
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DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
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*1 T| 1 In 1964, Richard and Nancy Madsen financed the 
purchase of their home by borrowing money from 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association 
("Prudential") under a real estate mortgage contract. The 
contract obligated the Madsens to make monthly payments 
into an account held by Prudential for the purpose of 
paying taxes and insurance premiums. Prudential paid no 
interest or earnings on the running account balance. The 
Madsens sued, seeking interest on their account. This case 
requires us to decide whether the Madsens may recover, 
on a common law accounting theory, profits that 
Prudential and its successor, Washington Mutual Bank 
("WAMU") may have earned from the use of the funds, or 
whether federal law preempts the Madsens' claim. We 
hold that federal law preempts the Madsens* claim. 
BACKGROUND 
% 2 This is the third appeal before us in the protracted 
history of this case, which was initiated more than thirty 
years ago. And although we have twice ruled in this case 
on appeal, our analysis of the issues requires a full 
explanation of the facts and procedural history. 
K 3 The facts forming the basis for the Madsens' claim are 
not in dispute. In 1964, the Madsens borrowed money 
from Prudential to finance the purchase of their home. The 
standard form trust deed used by Prudential required the 
Madsens, as trustors, to make monthly "budget payments" 
into an account held by Prudential, the trustee and 
beneficiary of the trust deed: 
In addition to the monthly payments as provided in said 
note the TRUSTOR agrees to pay to the beneficiary, 
upon the same day each month, budget payments 
estimated to equal one-twelfth of the annual taxes and 
insurance premiums; said budget payments to be 
adjusted from time to time as required, and said budget 
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payments are hereby pledged to the BENEFICIARY as 
additional security for the full performance of this deed 
of trust and the note secured hereby. The budget 
payments so accumulated may be withdrawn by the 
BENEFICIARY for the payment of taxes or insurance 
premiums due on the premises. The BENEFICIARY 
may at any time, without notice, apply said budget 
payments to the payment of any sums due under the 
terms of this deed of trust and the note secured hereby 
or either of them. 
The trust deed did not contain any provision requiring 
Prudential to pay interest or profits on the budget 
payments, and Prudential paid none. 
H 4 In 1975, the Madsens sued Prudential as the 
representatives of a class of borrowers who, like the 
Madsens, made budget payments to Prudential under the 
terms of their trust deeds. The Madsens brought a claim 
for breach of contract and sought an accounting of interest 
or profits under a theory of unjust enrichment (the 
"accounting claim"). The Madsens argued that Prudential 
was unjustly enriched because the budget payments were 
held as a pledge and the common law required Prudential, 
as pledgee, to account for any profits earned through the 
use of the pledge. 
*2 Tf 5 After the district court certified the class, 
Prudential sought judgment as a matter of law. In separate 
motions, Prudential moved the court to dismiss or grant 
summary judgment in its favor. In both motions, 
Prudential argued that federal law, which specifically 
authorized Prudential to hold budget payments without 
paying interest, preempted the Madsens' accounting claim. 
Furthermore, in one of its motions, Prudential argued that 
the contract, which was complete and unambiguous, 
contained no provision obligating Prudential to pay 
interest. 
® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No 
If 6 The district court granted summary judgment to 
Prudential on its contract claim without addressing its 
preemption claim. The court reasoned that "neither the 
contract provisions, express or implied, the principles of 
'unjust enrichment,' nor those of 'pledges' give to 
plaintiffs a claim upon which relief can be granted on the 
contract in question."The Madsens appealed, and we took 
up the case in Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings & 
LoanAss'n ("Madsen I")™ We reversed, holding that the 
funds deposited under the loan agreement satisfied the 
essential elements of a common law pledge: "The 
essential elements of a pledge are contained in the 
agreement, viz., the existence of a debt or obligation, a 
transfer of property to the pledgee, to be held as security 
and, if necessary, to be used to assure performance of the 
obligation."—We held that the common law of pledge 
required that "if from the use of [the pledge] profits are 
derived, pledgee must, in the absence of a special 
agreement, account for them to the pledgor." —Thus we 
remanded the case to the district court to consider the 
Madsens' accounting claim. 
FN 1.558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977). 
FN2./rf. at 1339. 
FN3./</. at 1340. 
U 7 Although Prudential referred to federal banking 
regulations as part of its policy argument in its appellate 
brief to us, Prudential did not argue federal preemption. 
Accordingly, our decision did not address federal banking 
regulations or federal preemption. Nor did our decision 
address the Madsens' claim for breach of contract. Instead, 
we confined our decision to whether the budget payments 
constituted a common law pledge.—We reversed the 
district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that 
the budget payments were such a pledge and that the 
Madsens could pursue their accounting claim. — 
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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FN4M at 1339-40. 
FN5./rf. 
% 8 Following the remand, Prudential removed the case to 
federal district court, asserting, as a basis for federal 
jurisdiction, that the case involved an important question 
of federal law. The Madsens moved for dismissal, arguing 
that the federal court lacked jurisdiction. When the federal 
district court denied the Madsens' motion to dismiss, the 
Madsens appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit in Madsen v. Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass'n ("Madsen II"). ^ The Tenth 
Circuit reversed, holding that "Prudential's claim of 
federal preemption is in the nature of a defense to the 
Madsens' cause of action and cannot be the basis of 
federal question jurisdiction on removal."—The case was 
remanded to the state district court.— 
FN6.635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir.1980). 
FN7.A/. at 802. 
FNZ.Id at 804. 
If 10 The parties proceeded to try the "test case" of 
Prudential's liability. Judge Kenneth Rigtrup limited the 
trial to the issue of whether Prudential earned profit from 
the use of the Madsens' pledged funds and, if so, how 
much. Because he narrowed the scope of the trial to this 
one issue, he did not allow Prudential to present evidence 
or argue in support of several defenses that it had urged. 
He did not allow Prudential to argue federal preemption or 
introduce evidence of a "special agreement" whereby the 
parties agreed that no interest would be paid. He then 
ruled in favor of the Madsens, awarding them $134.70 
plus interest from the date of judgment on their individual 
claim.^ 
¥N9.Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Saw & Loan 
Ass'n. 161 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1988). 
Tf 11 Prior to the trial and again prior to issuing his ruling, 
Judge Rigtrup disclosed to the parties that he was a 
potential class member, having financed the purchase of 
h is own home by b o r r o w i n g from 
Pmdential.^^Thirty-nine days after this ruling, Prudential 
moved to disqualify Judge Rigtrup. The presiding judge 
granted Prudential's motion, and the Madsens sought 
permission to file an interlocutory appeal.— 
FN10.M at 539-40. 
*3 1f 9 On remand in the state district court, Prudential 
revived the federal preemption argument in a new motion 
for summary judgment. In reply, the Madsens alleged that 
although we did not mention the federal preemption issue 
in our ruling, we had already decided the issue in the 
Madsens' favor in Madsen I. The Madsens further argued 
that the issue was decided in their favor by the Tenth 
Circuit in its ruling that the federal court had no 
jurisdiction. After a hearing, the district court ruled 
simply, "Prudential's Motion for Summary Judgment 
based upon federal preemption is hereby denied," offering 
no further explanation. 
FN1 !./</. at 541. 
% 12 We granted such permission and addressed Judge 
Rigtrup's disqualification inMadsen v. Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass'n ("Madsen 111")?^ We held that 
Prudential's motion to disqualify was not timely. — W e 
also ruled that Prudential apparently acquiesced in Judge 
Rigtrup's rendering a decision by failing to move for his 
disqualification until thirty-nine days after his 
ruling.—We concluded that Prudential's acquiescence 
was evidence that it did not believe that Judge Rigtrup 
® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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should recuse himself.— Further, we noted that although 
Judge Rigtrup had personal knowledge of some of the 
disputed facts and had a financial interest in the outcome 
of the case, the presiding judge expressly found no actual 
b i a s . ^ 
FN12.767 P.2d 538 OJtah 1988). 
FN13Jtf.at543. 
FN14.A/. at 543-44. 
FN15.M 
FN16.M at 544. 
% 13 Following the remand, Judge Rigtrup made a number 
of rulings, some of which the parties challenge in this 
appeal. First, he defined the class consistent with the 
Madsens' complaint as borrowers who had purchased a 
"single [-]family, owner-occupied, primary residence." 
This ruling excluded from the class borrowers who 
financed second homes, commercial properties, and 
multiplexes. Second, he ruled that the four-year statute of 
limitations in Utah Code section 78-12-25(3). "for relief 
not otherwise provided for by law," applied to the case. 
Third, he ruled that the 1979 Interest on Mortgage Loan 
Accounts Act cut off damages as of 1979. Thus, he limited 
the Madsens to recovering for the period from 1971 to 
1979. Fourth, he ruled that the Madsens were not entitled 
to prejudgment interest but that interest during the 
eight-year period would be compounded. Fifth, he 
appointed a special master to locate and define the class 
members and ascertain damages. The special master filed 
a final report on March 1, 2002, concluding that there 
were 9,547 class members, who were owed an average of 
$ 105.18, resulting in a total judgment of $ 1,004,153. The 
® 2008 Thomson R e u t e r s / W e s t . No 
Page 4 
2008 UT 69 
trial court, now presided over by Judge L.A. Dever, 
entered a judgment for that amount. 
*4 f 14 The Madsens appeal, and WAMU cross-appeals. 
Each asserts multiple errors. The Madsens assert that the 
district court erred by 
(1) applying a four-year statute of limitations rather than 
applying a six-year statute of limitations or holding that 
no limitations period applied; ^ ^ 
FN17. Utah Code section 78B-2-307 
(Supp.2008), which the court applied, provides 
that "[a]n action may be brought within four 
years ... for relief not otherwise provided for by 
law.'The Madsens argue that the court should 
have applied the former section 78-12-34 (now 
repealed), which provided that "actions [may be] 
brought, to recover money or other property 
deposited with any bank, trust company or 
savings and loan corporation, association or 
society, [without] limitation," or, in the 
alternative, section 78-12-25(2) (now amended), 
which provided a six-year statute of limitations 
for actions founded "upon any contract, 
obligation, or [for] liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing." 
(2) ruling that the 1979 Interest on Mortgage Loan 
Accounts Act cut off damages after 1979; 
(3) failing to award prejudgment interest covering the 
period from 1979 to the judgment; 
(4) narrowing the class to include only borrowers who 
financed owner-occupied single-family homes, which 
excluded borrowers who financed duplexes, second 
homes, and commercial properties; and 
Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(5) failing to disqualify the special master because he 
held ex parte meetings with WAMU and relied heavily 
on the work of WAMU employees. 
(2) erred by excluding evidence of a "special 
agreement" between the parties that no interest be paid 
on the pledged funds; 
K 15 The Madsens further argue that we should simplify 
the accounting of the profits earned and end the case by 
ordering the district court to use the pass-book savings 
rate instead of continuing the case with a newly appointed 
special master. 
f 16 WAMU cross-appeals, asserting that the district court 
(1) erred as a matter of law by not granting summary 
judgment on the basis that federal law as codified in 12 
C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) preempts the Madsens' state law 
c l a i m s ; ^ 
FN 18. WAMU preserved its federal preemption 
argument by making the argument to the district 
court both before and after Madsen I and to the 
federal district court. However, WAMU's brief in 
this appeal did not include a citation to the record 
showing that it had preserved this issue as 
required by our rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. While we decline to 
sanction WAMU under rule 24(k). we warn 
future litigants that compliance with our briefing 
requirements is not discretionary, and litigants 
who fail to comply take the risk that we may 
disregard or strike briefs or arguments. See, e.g., 
Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n, 2007 
UT 2. f 23. 151 P J d 962. We decline to 
disregard WAMU's preemption argument 
because, despite WAMU's oversight in this 
regard, it is clear that WAMU preserved the 
federal preemption argument and otherwise fully 
complied with the briefing requirements found in 
rule 24. 
(3) erred in certifying the class under rule 23(b)(1)(A) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: and 
(4) erred in awarding compound interest during the 
1971 to 1979 accounting period. 
U 17 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 
78A-3-102(3)(i) (Supp.2008). 
ANALYSIS 
f 18 In this opinion, we will first discuss the law of 
preemption generally. Then, we will discuss WAMU's 
argument that federal law preempts the Madsens' claim. 
We will also address the Madsens' contention that both 
this court and the Tenth Circuit have already decided the 
preemption question in the Madsens' favor in Madsen I 
and Madsen II, respectively. Because we hold that federal 
regulations preempt the Madsens' claim, it is unnecessary 
to reach the other issues on appeal and cross-appeal. 
I. FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTS CONFLICTING 
STATE LAW 
^ 19 Whether federal law preempts a state law cause of 
action is a question of law.^^We review questions of law 
for correctness, giving no deference to the ruling of the 
court below.^^Under the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution,— federal law preempts state law 
"where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress 
intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively" 
® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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or "to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal 
law."—In either case, it does not matter whether the state 
law is statutory or common law or whether the federal law 
is a federal regulation or statute of Congress.— 
FN 19.See Dev't of Human Servs. v. Hughes, 
2007 UT 30, 1115. 156 P.3d 820: see also 
Retherfordv. AT & TCommc'ns. 844 P.2d 949. 
958-59 (Utah 1992). 
FK20.R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. v. Wells 
Fargo Bank. N.A.. 2004 UT 48. T 7. 100 P.3d 
1159. 
FN21.U.S. Const, art. VI. cl. 2. 
FN22.Enelish v. 
79 (1990). 
FN23.5ee Free i 
General Elec. Co., 
'. Bland. 369 U.S. 
496 U.S. 72. 
663. 667-68 
(1962). 
U 20 In this case, WAMU has argued that the Madsens' 
state law accounting claim, which requires WAMU to pay 
profits earned on the Madsens' pledged funds, conflicts 
with federal law as codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c). 
WAMU contends that under this regulation and other 
federal laws, it has no obligation to pay interest or 
earnings on such accounts. If, under federal law, WAMU 
has no obligation to pay interest or earnings on the 
Madsens' pledged funds, federal law conflicts with, and 
therefore preempts, the Madsens' state law accounting 
claim. 
II. UNDER FEDERAL REGULATIONS IN EFFECT 
AT THE TIME OF THE CONTRACT, PRUDENTIAL 
HAD NO OBLIGATION TO PAY INTEREST ON 
RESERVE ACCOUNTS 
*5 K 21 WAMU argues that 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c), 
which exempts federal savings and loan associations from 
paying interest under certain circumstances, preempts any 
state law under which the Madsens might recover. That 
section reads as follows: 
A Federal association which makes a loan on or after 
June 16, 1975, on the security of a single-family 
dwelling occupied or to be occupied by the borrower 
(except such a loan for which a bona fide commitment 
was made before that date) shall pay interest on any 
escrow account maintained in connection with such a 
loan (1) if there is in effect a specific statutory provision 
or provisions of the State in which such dwelling is 
located by or under which the State-chartered savings 
and loan associations, mutual savings banks and similar 
institutions are generally required to pay interest on 
such escrow accounts, and (2) at not less than the rate 
required to be paid by such State-chartered institutions 
but not to exceed the rate being paid by the Federal 
association on its regular accounts (as defined by 
Section 526.1 of this chapter). Except as provided by 
contract, a Federal association shall have no obligation 
to pay interest on escrow accounts apart from the duties 
imposed by this paragraph. ^ ^ 
FN24.12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) (1976). 
f 22 Under this regulation, Prudential had no obligation to 
pay interest to the Madsens absent a state statute or 
contractual obligation to the contrary. The Madsens1 
accounting claim is not founded on a contract or statute. 
By its express terms, however, the regulation applies only 
prospectively to loans made after June 16, 1975. It does 
not apply to the Madsens' loan, which Prudential made in 
1964. But WAMU argues that § 545.6-11(c) did not alter 
the federal law applicable to the loans made before 1975. 
® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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Rather, WAMU contends, the 1975 change merely 
reaffirmed the impact of two existing regulations, which 
also provide that Prudential had no obligation to pay 
interest to the Madsens. — 
FN25. The Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 
created the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
which promulgated regulations governing the 
savings and loan industry beginning in 1933. 
% 23 WAMU is correct. Two regulations predating the 
Madsens' loan, 12 C.F.R. §§ 544.1 and 541.5, directly 
conflict with the Madsens' state law cause of action. Both 
regulations became part of the federal register in 1958 and 
thus apply to the Madsens' 1964 loans.—Section 544.1 
provides that a federal home loan association such as 
Prudential "is not required to distribute earnings on 
short-term savings accounts."—Section 541.5 defines 
short-term savings accounts to include "a savings account 
in a Federal association established for the purpose of 
accumulating funds to pay taxes or insurance premiums, 
or both, in connection with a loan on the security of a lien 
on real estate."—The Madsens' account held by 
Prudential fits this definition precisely. Therefore, the 
account is subject to section 544. h which explicitly 
provides that lenders who hold such accounts have no 
obligation to pay interest or earnings absent an agreement 
or state statute. The regulations directly conflict with the 
Madsens' state law claim. Federal law, therefore, preempts 
the Madsens' state law claim for interest on their account. 
FN26.23 C.F.R. § 9893 (1958). 
FN27.12C.F.R.S 544.1 0975). 
FN28.12C.F.R.8 541.5 (1975). 
III. NEITHER THIS COURT NOR THE TENTH 
CIRCUIT HAS YET RULED ON THE MERITS OF 
THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION ISSUE 
*6 K 24 The Madsens do not make any attempt to counter 
WAMU's federal preemption argument on the merits. 
Instead, their argument on appeal consists entirely of an 
assertion that the federal preemption issue has already 
been decided by this court in Madsen I and by the Tenth 
Circuit in Madsen //.But our opinion in Madsen I did not 
address, much less decide, the issue of federal preemption. 
And in Madsen II, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the case 
purely for lack of federal jurisdiction. As we did not rule 
on the merits of WAMU's federal preemption argument in 
Madsen I, and as the Tenth Circuit dismissed the case for 
lack of jurisdiction without reaching the merits in Madsen 
II, we now address for the first time the merits of 
WAMU's federal preemption argument. 
A. We Did Not Rule on the Merits of Federal 
Preemption in Madsen I 
% 25 The issue of preemption was not before us in Madsen 
I.™29 The district court had ruled that neither the contract 
nor the principles of pledge gave rise to a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. The district court did not 
rule on the issue of preemption. Accordingly, neither party 
appealed the issue of federal preemption. Our decision in 
Madsen I focused exclusively on whether the Madsens' 
budget payments satisfied the elements of a common law 
pledge.^We reversed the district court's ruling, holding 
that the budget payments met the elements of a common 
law pledge because there was "a debt or obligation, a 
transfer of property to the pledgee, to be held as security 
and, if necessary, to be used to assure performance of the 
obligation."—The decision did not include a single 
reference to any federal law, much less a resolution of 
whether federal law preempts the Madsens1 accounting 
claim. 
® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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FN29.558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977). 
FN30.M 
FN31Jtf.atl339. 
% 26 The Madsens' argue that, although they did not 
appeal the issue of preemption and neither our opinion nor 
the district court's grant of summary judgment addressed 
preemption, "Prudential's federal theory has already been 
presented to the Utah Supreme Court" and that "[i]f 12 
C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) destroyed Madsen's [sic] cause of 
action, the Utah Supreme Court would have been forced 
to affirm the trial court's dismissal over thirty years 
ago/This assertion is contrary to our well-established 
precedent that "an appellate courtnay affirm the judgment 
appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or 
theory apparent on the record.' " — When reviewing a 
decision made on one ground, we have the discretion to 
affirm the judgment on an alternative ground if it is 
apparent in the record. But that cannot mean, as the 
Madsens' contend here, that our declining to rule on an 
alternative ground can be construed as a ruling on the 
merits of the alternative ground, particularly when the 
alternative ground has not been argued by either party to 
the appeal. In fact, we frequently decline to rule on an 
issue when it has not been fully briefed by the parties 
because full briefing allows this court to carefully consider 
fully developed and supported argumentsP^The decision 
not to reach an alternative ground is certainly not binding 
on the court below, particularly when the parties did not 
argue the issue and this court's decision does not include 
so much as a single reference to the issue now supposedly 
foreclosed. 
FN32.P/wmfl v. McPhie. 2001 UT 6L If 18. 29 
P.3d 1225 (emphasis added) (quoting Limb v. 
Federated Milk Producers Ass% 461 P.2d 290, 
293 n. 2 (Utah 1969)). 
FN33.5ee, e.g., Pearson v. Pearson. 2008 UT 
24,11 10n.8, 182P.3d353 (declining to apply 
the Utah Uniform Parentage Act to a child 
custody dispute because the parties did not argue 
or brief the issue under that law). 
*7 K 27 In support of their argument that we have already 
ruled on the issue of preemption, the Madsens assert that 
Prudential made the federal preemption argument in its 
briefs. In fact, Prudential's appellate brief in Madsen I 
cited federal banking regulations, including 12 C.F.R. § 
545.6-11(c) in support of its policy argument against 
applying the law of pledge. But Prudential did not mention 
the law of federal preemption. The Madsens' briefs in that 
appeal likewise did not argue preemption. Thus the 
Madsens are incorrect in arguing that we have already 
decided the preemption issue. Having determined that we 
did not decide the issue in Madsen I, we now address the 
Madsens' contention that the Tenth Circuit decided the 
preemption issue in Madsen II 
B. The Tenth Circuit Did Not Rule on the Merits of 
Federal Preemption In Madsen II 
% 28 In Madsen II, the Tenth Circuit ruled on the Madsens' 
appeal from the federal district court, which had granted 
summary judgment in favor of Prudential on the basis of 
preemption: 
Under the federal preemption doctrine, Madsens have 
no claim against Prudential for interest on their escrow 
account. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) clearly precludes the 
relief the Madsens are seeking.... More importantly, the 
regulation cited above does not appear to alter the 
federal law applicable to loans made before June 16, 
1975, but instead appears to reaffirm the impact of JL2 
C.F.R. §§ 544.1 ("association is not required to 
distribute earnings on short-term savings accounts") and 
541.5 (defining short-term savings account as including 
® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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mortgage loan escrow accounts for taxes and 
insurance).— 
FN34.635 F.2d 797, 800 (10th Cir.1980). 
The Madsens argued that the federal court lacked 
jurisdiction and appealed to the Tenth Circuit.^^The 
issue on appeal was whether the federal court had federal 
question jurisdiction, specifically whether the suit arose 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States ~^The 
Tenth Circuit held that federal jurisdiction existed only if 
the "federal right or immunity [is] an essential element of 
the plaintiffs cause of action, and that the federal 
controversy must be 'disclosed on the face of the 
complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for 
removal.' " — It went on to hold that "[bjecause the 
Madsens have predicated their suit upon rights created 
under state law, the fact that federal regulations may 
create a defense to recovery on such a claim is immaterial 
to a finding of federal question jurisdiction." — 
FN35.W. 
FN36./rf. 
FN37.M (quoting Gully v. First Nat'l Bank. 299 
U.S. 109. 113(1936)). 
FN38.W. at 801. 
K 29 Although the Tenth Circuit explicitly ruled on 
jurisdictional grounds, the Madsens argue that the 
following language in the Tenth Circuit's opinion 
constitutes a decision on the merits of the preemption 
argument: 
Here, it is vigorously argued that application of state 
law would create a significant conflict because federal 
policy requires uniform nationwide standards for the 
handling of escrow accounts by federal savings and loan 
associations. This argument founders on the very 
language of the regulation cited to support it. Section 
545.6-11(c) provides that a federal savings and loan 
association shall pay interest on escrow accounts if a 
state statute requires such payments to be made by 
state-chartered institutions, or if payments are required 
by contract. The regulation expressly anticipates that the 
obligation of a federal institution to pay interest on 
escrow accounts not only will vary from state to state, 
but from contract to contract. 
*8 ... 
Given the absence of a significant conflict between the 
federal policy expressed in section 545.6-11(c) and the 
use of state law, we hold that state law is applicable in 
determining whether Prudential contracted to pay 
interest on the Madsens' escrow account—^ 
FN39.A/. at 802-03 (emphasis added). 
% 30 This, the Madsens argue, is the Tenth Circuit's 
pronouncement that the federal regulation does not 
conflict with their claim for interest, and thus federal law 
does not preempt their state law claim. 
K 31 The Madsens are incorrect. The discussion cited 
above is presented in response to Prudential's argument 
that the controversy required the court to apply federal 
common law in determining whether the parties had 
entered into a contract for the payment of interest. A 
controversy that requires the application of federal 
common law necessarily arises under the laws of the 
United States. But federal courts only apply federal 
common law to cases in which there is "a significant 
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conflict between some federal policy or interest and the 
use of state law."i^The passage cited by the Madsens is 
the Tenth Circuit's acknowledgment that under the explicit 
terms of 21 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c), lenders' interest 
obligations could be varied by contract between private 
parties. The question of whether such a private contract 
had been created is, as the Tenth Circuit concluded, 
governed by state law. Interest obligations that varied 
from state to state or from contract to contract would not 
disrupt a federal scheme requiring uniformity. 
VK40. Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp.. 384 
U.S. 63. 68(1966). 
T| 32 In this case, however, the Madsens have not claimed 
that a provision in the contract obligated Prudential to pay 
interest. Indeed, there is no such provision. Moreover, 
they concede that there is no applicable state statute. So 
while the federal regulation explicitly permits the interest 
obligation to vary by private contract or by state statute, in 
this case we have neither. And in the absence of a contract 
or statute, the regulation is clear that Prudential had no 
obligation to pay interest. The mere fact that the Tenth 
Circuit acknowledged that under the explicit terms of the 
regulation, the interest obligation may be established by 
private contract or statute in no way changes the fact that 
absent either, Prudential had no obligation to pay interest 
on the budget payment accounts. 
f 33 Thus the Madsens are incorrect in arguing that this 
court or the Tenth Circuit has already decided the 
preemption issue, and it is appropriate that we resolve the 
issue in this appeal. For the reasons discussed in section 
II, we reverse the district court's ruling, hold that federal 
law preempts the Madsens' accounting claim, and remand 
with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of 
WAMU. Because we decide that federal law preempts the 
Madsens' claim, it is unnecessary to reach the other issues 
in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
T[ 34 We conclude that federal law preempts the Madsens' 
claim for profits earned on pledged funds in reserve 
accounts maintained by Prudential in connection with their 
real estate mortgage. Because federal law preempts the 
Madsens' cause of action, it is unnecessary to reach the 
other issues presented by the parties in this appeal. We 
reverse and remand with instructions to enter summary 
judgment in favor of WAMU. 
K 35 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice PARRISH, Judge 
GREENWOOD, and Judge WESTFALL concur in 
Associate Chief Justice DURRANTS opinion. 
K 36 Having disqualified himself, Justice WILKINS does 
not participate herein; District Court Judge G. MICHAEL 
WESTFALL sat. 
K 37 Justice NEHRING does not participate herein; Court 
of Appeals Judge PAMELA T. GREENWOOD sat. 
Utah,2008. 
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